

1 DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT
Department of Industrial Relations
2 State of California
BY: DAVID L. GURLEY (Bar No. 194298)
3 455 Golden Gate Ave., 9th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94102
4 Telephone: (415) 703-4863

5 Attorney for the Labor Commissioner

6 BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
7 OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

8
9
10 DWIGHT BRYAN and JENNIFER BRYAN,) Case No. TAC 22-99
individually, jointly and as the)
11 parents and guardians ad litem of)
ZACHERY TY BRYAN; ZACHERY TY BRYAN,)
12)
Petitioners,)
13 vs.) DETERMINATION OF
CONTROVERSY
14)
LAX CORPORATION, a California)
15 Corporation,)
16 Respondents.)
17)

18 INTRODUCTION

19 The above-captioned petition was filed on June 10, 1999,
20 by DWIGHT BRYAN and JENNIFER BRYAN as guardians ad litem of ZACHERY
21 TY BRYAN (hereinafter Petitioner or "ZACH"), alleging that the LAX
22 CORPORATION, (hereinafter Respondent or "LAXES"), acted as a talent
23 agency without possessing the required California talent agency
24 license pursuant to Labor Code §1700.5¹. Petitioner seeks a
25 determination voiding *ab initio* the management agreement between
26

27
28 ¹ All statutory citations will refer to the California Labor Code unless
otherwise specified.

1 According to Zach's father Dwight, the respondents stated that
2 while developing Zach and guiding his career, they could also do
3 anything a talent agent could do except close deals. The parties
4 developed a relationship and on November 19, 1992, they entered
5 into a management agreement where the respondents would manage
6 Zach's entertainment career and be compensated by 15% of Zach's
7 gross earnings.²

8 3. After several months of representation, Zach's
9 parents terminated the contract with their existing talent agent.
10 And between 1993 and 1996 the Laxes, and the Bryans, along with
11 attorney Dennis Arti, acted as Zach's representatives for all
12 purposes relating to the entertainment industry. It is
13 predominately during this time period that petitioners allege
14 respondents acted as an unlicensed talent agency.

15 4. In July of 1993, during the renegotiation of "Home
16 Improvement's" third season, the respondents aided the Bryans by
17 communicating the desired terms and conditions of employment to
18 Disney representative Scottye Hedstrom. Negotiations became
19 exacerbated and executive producer Tim Allen, along with
20 petitioner's attorney Dennis Arti, assisted in negotiations. Arti
21 then oversaw the legalities and finalized the deal.

22 5. Throughout the relationship, the Laxes admitted
23 sending Zach's resumes to various production companies in attempts
24 to obtain employment, but in defense testified it was done only at
25 the request of the Bryans. The Laxes argued that the Bryans acted
26 so pervasively in the development of their son, by choosing roles,

27 ² Earnings in connection with "Home Improvement" were calculated
28 separately and with a different pay structure.

1 requesting solicitation for specific jobs, and seeking terms and
2 conditions of employment, that by conducting themselves in this
3 fashion the Bryans acted ostensibly as their son's talent agents.
4 Consequently, the Laxes argued they were simply conduits of
5 information to production companies and should be shielded from
6 liability pursuant to §1700.44(d)³.

7 6. The Laxes steadfastly maintained that they did not
8 solicit engagements themselves. The evidence reflected in late
9 1993, the Laxes sent form letters to various advertisers of the
10 1994 World Cup, including Coca Cola and others, seeking a position
11 for Zach as an advertiser's spokesperson. Mrs. Lax also sent a
12 solicitation letter to Steve Leland seeking Zach's participation in
13 the "Tournament of Roses Parade". When confronted with these
14 documents, the respondents unconvincingly argued each solicitation
15 was performed at the request of the Bryans and again suggested that
16 as long as the Bryans requested the Laxes to perform these
17 functions, the Laxes should be cloaked in protection.

18 7. The evidence established that the Laxes did more
19 than solicit employment at the request of the Bryans. They
20 negotiated terms and conditions of employment contracts. In
21 February of 1993, the Laxes negotiated the terms and conditions of
22 employment for Zach with a French production company, Marathon
23 Productions, who filmed "A Week in the Life of a Young Television
24 Star". The documentary evidence revealed that Mr. Lax made various

25
26 ³ Labor Code §1700.44(d) states, "it is not unlawful for a person or
27 corporation which is not licensed pursuant to this chapter to act in conjunction
28 with and at the request of a licensed talent agency in the negotiation of an
employment contract."

1 "demands" to the production company, including compensation, and
2 revenue on U.S. exhibition of the film. And according to a fax
3 from Mr. Lax to the Bryans, "they [Marathon Films] have now agreed
4 to all my demands." Moreover, there was no talent agent or
5 attorney involved in this deal. Again, respondents unconvincingly
6 argued that any material terms sought and received, were not
7 negotiations on their part, but instead requests by the Bryans.
8 This testimony was not credible. The Laxes were sophisticated
9 negotiators with decades of experience, while the Bryans were
10 initially naive relying heavily on there chosen representatives.

11 8. Throughout 1994 and 1995, Zach participated as a
12 celebrity guest at various car shows. The evidence disclosed that
13 as his celebrity rose, his compensation exponentially increased and
14 those increases in remuneration were at the request of Mrs. Lax.
15 And similarly, in all rudimentary negotiations, i.e., mall
16 appearances, it was the Laxes who negotiated Zach's appearance fees
17 while no attorney or other licensed representatives were involved.
18 The Laxes could not provide any documents or credible testimony
19 which could refute petitioner's declarations, testimony and scores
20 of documents referencing respondent's solicitation and negotiation
21 efforts. When asked to explain these apparent contradictions
22 between their testimony and petitioner's documents, the respondent
23 again replied that all solicitations or negotiations were done only
24 at the request of the Bryans; or alternatively, they just could not
25 remember the document and had no explanation. On the other hand,
26 when respondents were requested to authenticate supporting
27 documents from the same time period during the presentation of
28 their case in chief, their memory had regained full capacity.

1 Credibility was an issue.

2 9. Mrs. Lax vigorously argued that the Bryans
3 transactional attorney, Dennis Arti, assisted by closing the deals
4 and conducting all of the necessary legal work for "most of the
5 deals for Zach". Mrs. Lax relied on this position to seemingly
6 indemnify the corporation. It's respondent's position that if they
7 assisted in procuring engagements in conjunction with a licensed
8 attorney, those negotiations would be exempt from liability
9 pursuant to the exemption found Labor Code §1700.44(d). Assuming,
10 arguendo, that this was a legitimate defense, which it is not, the
11 testimony was contradicted by mounds of evidence revealing scores
12 of employment engagements with no Arti involvement.

13 10. But Dennis Arti was involved in several settings.
14 In June of 1994 the evidence reflected that Mrs. Lax conducted most
15 of the deal points for a film entitled "MAGIC ISLAND". But it was
16 Dennis Arti who would oversee and finalize the agreement between
17 Zach and Magic Island's production company Milenia Films. This is
18 an example of several employment engagements, including the
19 renegotiation of the "Home Improvement" contract, that required
20 legal expertise from an experienced transactional attorney. During
21 complex negotiations, Dennis Arti was routinely called upon.

22 11. Finally, respondents argued that because Zach was
23 such a high profile actor, offers were abundant and solicitations
24 therefore were not necessary. In fact, as argued, procurement was
25 rarely necessary. Respondents argued, if the job came directly to
26 Zach's management team they would field the offer. If it was a
27 scale deal they would relay that information to Zach's parents and
28 accept the offer if instructed. In the rare instance when

1 violations barred by the one-year statute of limitations at Labor
2 Code §1700.44(c)⁵.

3 b) Does the Waisbren or Wachs standard apply to
4 alleged violations that occurred between these rulings?

5 c) Can a minor artist's parents who request the
6 manager to negotiate and/or solicit, be construed as a talent
7 agent, thus shielding a manager from liability under §1700.44(d).

8 d) Can a licenced attorney not separately licensed
9 as a talent agent, stand in place of the agent and satisfy the
10 exemption found under Labor Code §1700.44(d)

11
12 (a) Statute of Limitations

13 3. Labor Code §1700.44(c) provides that "no action or
14 proceeding shall be brought pursuant to [the Talent Agencies Act]
15 with respect to any violation which is alleged to have occurred
16 more than one year prior to the commencement of this action or
17 proceeding." Respondent argues that the petition was filed in
18 June of 1999 and consequently, the petitioner's may only allege
19 violations that occurred after June of 1998, and not as
20 petitioner alleges in this petition, between 1993 and 1996.

21 4. The petitioner raises the issue of respondent's
22 unlicensed status purely as a defense to the proceedings brought
23 by respondent's action against the petitioner filed in superior
24 court. A statute of limitations is procedural, that is it only
25 affects the remedy, not the substantive right or obligation. It

26 ⁵ §1700.44(c) provides that "no action or proceeding shall be brought
27 pursuant to [the Talent Agencies Act] with respect to any violation which is
28 alleged to have occurred more than one year prior to the commencement of this
action or proceeding.

1 runs only against causes of action and defenses seeking
2 affirmative relief, and not against any other defenses to an
3 action. The statute of limitations does not bar the defense of
4 illegality of a contract, and in any action or proceeding where
5 the plaintiff is seeking to enforce the terms of an illegal
6 contract, the other party may allege and prove illegality as a
7 defense without regard to whether the statute of limitations for
8 bringing an action or proceeding has already expired. Sevano v.
9 Artistic Production, Inc., (1997)TAC No. 8-93 pg.11. The Bryans
10 brought this action in precisely that fashion. What other choice
11 did the Bryans have? The Labor Commissioner has primary and
12 exclusive jurisdiction in controversies arising between artists
13 and agents. In short, the Bryan's are literally left with no
14 alternative but to file this petition before the Labor
15 Commissioner in defense of the superior court action.

16 5. Additionally, this issue was brought before the
17 California Court of Appeals in Park v. Deftones 84 Cal.Rptr.2d
18 616, at 618, which agreed with the Labor Commissioners ruling in
19 Moreno v. Park (1998) TAC No. 9-97, p.4, stating, "the attempt to
20 collect commissions allegedly due under the agreement was itself
21 a violation of the Act." Consequently, Parks held any petition
22 filed within one year of the filing of the superior court is
23 within the statute of limitations. In that case, as here, the
24 petitioner has brought this case before the Labor Commissioner as
25 a result of respondents superior court action filed in February
26 of 1999. Therefore, following Park, the petitioner has through
27 February 2000 to file his petitioner with the Labor Commissioner.
28 The petition was filed in June of 1999 and thus timely. Park

1 adds, "it also assures that the party who has engaged in illegal
2 activity may not avoid its consequences through the timing of his
3 own collection action." Park, supra at 618. Respondent's argue
4 Park should not be applied retroactively. We disagree in that
5 the Labor Commissioner has always held that a petition may be
6 filed to defend an action brought by a manager attempting to
7 enforce an illegal contract. And the application of the Park
8 decision does not deviate from this historical enforcement
9 position. We conclude under either theory, §1700.44(c) does not
10 bar petitioner from asserting the defense of illegality of the
11 contract on the ground that respondent acted as an unlicensed
12 talent agent. To hold otherwise, as described in Park, would
13 allow a party to avoid its illegal activity through the timing of
14 its own collection activity and thereby provide an unlicensed
15 agent a disturbing means to avoid the requirements of the Talent
16 Agencies Act.

17
18 **(b) Waisbren or Wachs**

19 6. The primary issue in this case is whether based
20 on the evidence presented at this hearing, did the respondent
21 operate as a "talent agency" within the meaning of Labor Code
22 §1700.4(a). Labor Code §1700.4(a) defines "talent agency" as, "a
23 person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring,
24 offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or
25 engagements for an artist or artists."

26 7. In Waisbren v. Peppercorn Production, Inc (1995)
27 41 Cal.App.4th 246, the court held that any single act of
28 procuring employment subjects the agent to the Talent Agencies

1 Act's licensing requirement, thereby upholding the Labor
2 Commissioner's long standing interpretation that a license is
3 required for any procurement activities, no matter how incidental
4 such activities are to the agent's business as a whole. Applying
5 Waisbren, it is clear respondent acted in the capacity of a
6 talent agency within the meaning of Labor Code §1700.4(a).

7 8. Respondent's argue that the earlier holding in
8 Wachs v. Curry (1993) 13 Cal.App4th 616, 628 should control. The
9 Wachs court reasoned, "[T]he occupation of procuring employment
10 was intended to be determined to a standard that measures the
11 significance of the agent's employment procurement function
12 compared to the agent's counseling function taken as a whole. If
13 the agent's employment procurement function constitutes a
14 significant part of the agent's business as a whole, then he or
15 she is subject to the licensing requirement of the Act."

16 9. Many of the alleged violations occurred prior to
17 the Waisbren ruling and after Wachs. Still, the Waisbren
18 decision is well reasoned and persuasive on the issue of whether
19 a license is required for incidental or occasional procurement
20 activities. Its analysis of the dicta in Wachs leaves little
21 doubt that the contrary views expressed by the [Wachs] court are
22 in basic conflict with the Act's remedial purpose and legislative
23 history. In cases where this question is presented, the Labor
24 Commissioner will follow the holding of the Waisbren decision;
25 the "significance" of the putative agents procurement function is
26 not relevant to a determination of whether a license is required.
27 Sevano supra., pg 19. Moreover, even had the Wachs view

1 controlled, the respondent's procurement activities were such a
2 significant part of the managers business as a whole that
3 licensure would be required.
4

5 (c) Can a Minor Artist's Parents be Construed a
6 Talent Agent, if Negotiations by the Manager
7 are Done at the Request of the Artist's Parents?
8

9 10. Conceivably, the parents may be considered an
10 agent if they procured employment without a license and the minor
11 artist files a petition to have a contract between the artist and
12 the parents voided. Otherwise, this argument is red herring.
13 Clearly, those facts are not at issue here. The Bryans were
14 involved with Zach's career and undoubtedly made many requests to
15 the Laxes. They desired to be in an integral position throughout
16 the pursuit of Zach's success. That parental enthusiasm will not
17 shield respondents from liability. It was the Laxes who
18 solicited, and negotiated entertainment engagements and it was
19 their responsibility to obtain a talent agency license or refrain
20 from talent agency activities. To hold that any parent who makes
21 suggestions to a minor artist's manager about jobs, and
22 accordingly the manager follows that instruction, will somehow
23 shield that artist's manager from liability would be an
24 arbitrary, enforcement interpretation that would contravene the
25 remedial purpose of the Act, which is to protect artists by
26 punishing unlicensed players engaging with impunity in talent
27 agency activity.

28 11. Additionally, the rule is well established in

1 this state that ... when the Legislature enacts a statute
2 forbidding certain conduct for the purpose of protecting one
3 class of persons from the activities of another, a member of the
4 protected class may maintain an action notwithstanding the fact
5 that he has shared in the illegal transaction. The protective
6 purpose of the legislation is realized by allowing the plaintiff
7 to maintain his action against a defendant within the class
8 primarily to be deterred. In this situation it is said that the
9 plaintiff is not in pari delicto.' Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball
10 Sons, 48 Cal.2d 141, 308 P.2d 713, 720. Therefore, irrespective
11 of the fact that the Bryans requested and/or even encouraged the
12 Laxes to find work for Zach, these actions by the Bryans will not
13 alter the Laxes' legal responsibilities under the Act and will
14 not absolve the respondents of their illegalities.

15
16 (d) Can an Unlicensed Artist's Representative
17 Utilize an Attorney in Place of a Licenced
18 Talent Agency in the Application of
19 Labor Code §1700.44(d)
20

21 12. Labor Code §1700.44(d) states, "it is not
22 unlawful for a person or corporation which is not licensed
23 pursuant to this chapter to act in conjunction with and at the
24 request of a licensed talent agency in the negotiation of an
25 employment contract."

26 13. The express language of the exemption provides
27 that a "licensed talent agency" may invoke the exemption. An
28 attorney is not specified in 1700.44(d), or anywhere else within

1 the Act that could be construed to extend the exemption to
2 licensed attorneys.

3 14. In construing a statute, court[s] must consider
4 consequences that might flow from particular construction and
5 should construe the statute so as to promote rather than defeat
6 the statute's purpose and policy. Escobedo v. Estate of Snider
7 (1997) 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 14 Cal.4th 1214, 930 P.2d 979. As
8 discussed, the purpose of the statute is to protect artists from
9 unscrupulous representatives. The Act provides a comprehensive
10 licensing scheme that allows the Labor Commissioner to regulate
11 agent activity through, *inter alia*, the approval of all contracts
12 and commission structures. Expanding the exemption invites
13 unregulated conduct that runs counter to the Act's remedial
14 purpose.

15 15. In addition, an exception contained in a statute
16 to the general rule laid down therein must be strictly construed.
17 Thorpe v. Long Beach Community College Dist. (App. 2 Dist. 2000)
18 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 897, 83 Cal.App.4th 655. Consequently, the Labor
19 Commissioner may not add words to a statute, particularly an
20 exception to the general rule, that would essentially change the
21 meaning of the statute. There may be considerable opposition
22 that could argue an attorney's license involves far greater
23 protections for an artist/client than a talent agency license.
24 However, we cannot rewrite the statute. That is for the
25 legislature. To hold otherwise would be counter to the remedial
26 purpose of the Act and provide unregulated managers the ability to
27 avoid the Act's liability through a means possibly not
28 contemplated by the drafter.


1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

initio. Respondent has no enforceable rights under these contracts.

Having made no showing that the respondent collected commissions within the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by Labor Code §1700.44(c), petitioner is not entitled to recoup commissions.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28


Dated: April 26, 2001



DAVID L. GURLEY
Attorney for the Labor Commissioner

ADOPTED AS THE DETERMINATION OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER:

Dated: 4/26/01



TOM GROGAN
Deputy Chief

